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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States is one
of the intellectual anchors of modern First Amendment doctrine.1  In that
opinion, Holmes sets out two core aspects of his free speech jurisprudence:
his pragmatic concern about majoritarian control and his quasi-libertarian
preference for the “competition of the market.”2  In the century since
Abrams, we have witnessed changes in society, technology, and politics that
have shaped and reshaped the contours of our First Amendment landscape.
But not everything has changed—some aspects of our human experience
remain remarkably similar to the context in which Holmes wrote.
One unchanged aspect of the human condition is our inability to know
with certainty.3  Confronted with this reality in his own day, Holmes, at times,
gestured toward a foundationless relativism.4  But even if his larger corpus
© 2019 John Inazu.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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1 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Holmes’s Abrams dissent marked a significant shift from his opinion nine months earlier in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See generally THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DIS-
SENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF
FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2013).
2 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
3 I am not suggesting that understandings of epistemology have remained
unchanged, only that people generally recognized epistemic limits to certainty in both
Holmes’s day and our own.
4 For an account of Holmes’s pragmatism and its relationship to key aspects of the
broader philosophical strands of American pragmatism, see Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989).  For a more critical account that places
Holmes’s thought closer to nihilism, see ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES:
THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000).
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hints toward that direction, his Abrams dissent can be read to sketch a less
skeptical approach rooted in a kind of epistemic humility.5  This interpreta-
tion enlists Holmes as an advocate for more charitable discourse across deep
differences.6  In today’s pluralistic society, acknowledging our lack of cer-
tainty can help us move toward better dialogue with one another.  At a time
when we too often sacralize our own views and condemn our opponents,
epistemic humility could help our society avoid escalating from weaponized
words to actual weapons.  This is no small matter.  Holmes knew firsthand the
reality of violence, having watched friends die in the Civil War and having
himself been wounded three times in battle.  We are nowhere close to that
kind of violence, but we should not think it unimaginable.  As philosopher
Alasdair MacIntyre has quipped, “[m]odern politics is civil war carried on by
other means.”7  The less we are able to maintain civil dialogue across deep
disagreement, the more we may glimpse the possibility of actual violence.8
This Article suggests that the kind of epistemic humility we can find in
Holmes’s Abrams dissent provides an important resource for preserving a sta-
ble political order.  Part I offers a reading of the famous dissent that focuses
on the humility underlying Holmes’s epistemic claims and explains the impli-
cations of this humility for discourse norms.  Part II distinguishes epistemic
humility from more skeptical views.  Part III then applies a lens of epistemic
humility to three kinds of truth claims in contemporary discourse: claims
whose certainty is not provable (focusing on the example of religious claims),
claims whose practical certainty is not yet proven (focusing on the example
of medical treatments of transgender children), and claims that are certain
to be false (focusing on the example of demonstrable lies).
5 Like much of Holmes’s writing, his Abrams dissent displays internal tensions and
lends itself to multiple interpretations. JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE
EMPIRE OF FORCE 34 n.9 (2006) (describing Holmes’s Abrams dissent as “marked by ten-
sions—between skepticism and faith, brute power and idealization, tolerance and judg-
ment, dominance and truth—that characterize his work as a whole, calling upon the
reader to exercise independent and complex judgment of his or her own”); Steven D.
Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649,
653 n.9 (1987) (characterizing the dissent as “a mixture of faith and doubt”).
6 For my extended views on navigating dialogue across differences, see JOHN D.
INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH DEEP DIFFERENCE (2016).
7 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 253 (3d ed. 2007).
8 See, e.g., JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA’S CULTURE WAR 4–5 (1994) (“[C]ulture wars always precede shoot-
ing wars . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Melissa Gomez, Charlottesville Car Attack Suspect Pleads
Not Guilty to Federal Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
07/05/us/charlottesville-plea-hate-crimes.html (describing white supremacist James Alex
Fields Jr., charged with thirty federal charges for hate crimes, one of which involved mur-
dering demonstrator Heather Heyer by ramming his car into her).
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I. EPISTEMIC HUMILITY IN HOLMES’S ABRAMS DISSENT
Holmes’s Abrams dissent culminates in a remarkable paragraph that
appeals to the “free trade in ideas.”9  The much-discussed market metaphor
stems from Holmes’s belief that the “experiment” of the First Amendment
requires a willingness to see the “ultimate good” in speech-protective
norms.10  In some cases, the commitment to such norms rises above our own
substantive convictions, at least enough to constrain our desire to prevail at
all costs.  Of course, speech-protective norms will not by themselves lead to a
healthy society.11  But Holmes’s intuition—at least as I have characterized it
here—is that these norms will be a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition
for establishing healthy dialogue and protecting dissent in a pluralistic
society.
Holmes did not always hold this view.  For much of his judicial career, he
regarded tolerance as simply out of reach: the solution to political disagree-
ment was to suppress the other side.  As Thomas Healy has noted of Holmes:
“As a believer in society’s right to impose its will on the individual, he
thought persecution of dissenters made perfect sense.”12  Healy suggests that
Holmes arrived at a different view in his Abrams dissent only after a sustained
lobbying effort from some of his closest friends, including Judge Learned
Hand and Harold Laski.13  Just months prior to Abrams, Holmes had written
the majority opinion in Schenck v. United States, upholding criminal convic-
tions against a First Amendment challenge under the “clear and present dan-
ger” standard.14  After reading Schenck, Hand and Laski set out to convince
Holmes he was wrong by pleading their case for tolerance.
Hand led the way, following a chance encounter with Holmes on a train.
Writing to Holmes after their meeting, Hand argued for tolerance in light of
uncertainty:
Opinions are at best provisional hypotheses, incompletely tested.  The more
they are tested, after the tests are well scrutinized, the more assurance we
may assume, but they are never absolutes.  So we must be tolerant of oppo-
9 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: WHY THE
FIRST AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT PROTECT HATE SPEECH AND WHITE SUPREMACY (2018); Fred-
erick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1613, 1635 (2015) (arguing that broader free speech protections might have negative con-
sequences, including more deference to governmental decisionmaking and weaker stan-
dards for appellate review).
12 HEALY, supra note 1, at 21.
13 See generally id. at 16–44 (describing Judge Learned Hand’s and Harold Laski’s per-
suasive interactions with Holmes prior to his Abrams dissent).  Patrick Kelley has argued
that Holmes’s change of mind may have been prompted in part by concern about his
reputation among “the intelligent and the informed.” See Patrick J. Kelley, The Life of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 429, 472–73, 475 (1990) (book review).
14 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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site opinions or varying opinions by the very fact of our incredulity of our
own.15
Healy observes that Hand’s letter clarified that “[h]e didn’t mean aban-
doning one’s convictions or refusing to fight for one’s beliefs.”16  But even
with our firmly held convictions, “[w]e should be tolerant of those who disa-
gree with us because there is a chance we are wrong and they are right.”17
Holmes was not immediately persuaded.  He wrote Hand the following
week to point out that a lack of certainty is not just true of our beliefs but “is
the condition of every act.”18  And yet he believed we all must act in a world
without certainty and without “bother[ing] about absolute truth or even
inquir[ing] whether there is such a thing.”19  This was the pinnacle of
Holmes’s pragmatism, which he punctuated with a harsh realism a few
sentences later: “When I was young I used to define the truth as the majority
vote of that nation that can lick all others.”20
Holmes shared Hand’s letters with Laski shortly thereafter.21  In an ini-
tial conversation with Holmes, Laski expressed a more instrumental view that
we protect speech, believing that false or dangerous ideas will be discredited
over time.22  Holmes responded to Laski in a letter following their
conversation:
My thesis would be (1) if you are cocksure, and (2) if you want it very much,
and (3) if you have no doubt of your power—you will do what you believe
efficient to bring about what you want—by legislation or otherwise.
In most matters of belief we are not cocksure, we don’t care very much,
and we are not certain of our power.  But in the opposite case we should
deal with the act of speech as we deal with any other overt act that we don’t
like.23
Holmes’s words to Laski forecasted his language in Abrams:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logi-
cal.  If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain
result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep
away all opposition.  To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that
15 HEALY, supra note 1, at 22 (quoting Hand’s letter of June 22, 1918).
16 Id. at 23.
17 Id. at 24 (summarizing Hand’s position); see also INAZU, supra note 6, at 88–90
(exploring similar themes in a discussion of humility).
18 HEALY, supra note 1, at 24 (quoting Holmes’s letter of June 24, 1918).
19 Id. at 25.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 36.  By this time in his career, Laski was immersed in developing his theory of
pluralism, which he would subsequently publish as Authority in the Modern State. Id. at 36,
120.
22 Id. at 37. But see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) (framing free speech as important to social progress, because “freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth”); HEALY, supra note 1, at 99 (noting John Stuart Mill’s defense of free
speech as essential because of the fallibility of human judgment).
23 HEALY, supra note 1, at 37–38 (quoting Holmes’s letter of July 7, 1918).
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you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the
circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you
doubt either your power or your premises.24
Taken together, these sentences from Abrams suggest that if you are cer-
tain of the correctness of your beliefs, it makes perfect sense to crush the
other side when you have the power to do so.  People will only opt for toler-
ance in lieu of suppression under one of three conditions: (1) when they
think the other side poses no risk of persuading others, (2) when the con-
tested issue is too small to matter, or (3) when they doubt the veracity of their
own beliefs or their ability to force others to comply with them.25
The first two conditions are conceptually possible but highly unlikely
when it comes to the most contentious issues of our day like abortion,
LGBTQ rights, immigration, police violence, or gun control.  Partisans on
both sides of these issues are unlikely to see them as too small to matter.  To
the contrary, they increasingly claim a “sacred” status for their own perspec-
tive: they see a “right way” to view an issue, they refuse to permit even partial
disagreement or dissent, and they cast their opponents as morally deficient.26
Yet even in the face of such heated rhetoric, some people do change their
minds, which means these same partisans recognize some risk that opposing
speech will persuade others.  In other words, neither of Holmes’s first two
conditions for tolerance seems very plausible: when it comes to the issues that
most divide us, we are unlikely to conclude that our speech does not matter,
and we are unlikely to decide that the issues are simply unimportant.  That
leaves only one option under Holmes’s framework to lead us toward toler-
ance: doubt.
24 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
25 See id.  In Abrams, Holmes shifted from the conjunctive “and” in his letter to Laski to
the disjunctive “or” in his list of certainties.  The wording change clarifies that people may
opt for tolerance when any one of Holmes’s three conditions is unmet, as opposed to only
when all three conditions are unmet.  Note, too, that these three conditions are not the
only possibilities.  For example, a political theory that values political autonomy either
intrinsically (as normatively good) or instrumentally (to facilitate control or stability)
might allow citizens to engage in oppositional or false political speech.  But when we move
from political theory to human nature, Holmes’s three conditions cover a good bit of the
landscape.
26 See, e.g., Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Enter-
ing the United States,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-mus-
lims-entering-the-united-states/ (quoting then-candidate Donald Trump saying that many
Muslims have “great hatred towards Americans” and “have no sense of reason or respect
for human life” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dan Merica, On Women’s Health, Clin-
ton Compares Republicans to ‘Terrorist Groups,’ CNN (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/
2015/08/27/politics/hillary-clinton-republicans-terrorist-groups/index.html (quoting a
speech by candidate Hillary Clinton in which she asserted: “Now, extreme views about
women, we expect that from some of the terrorist groups, we expect that from people who
don’t want to live in the modern world, but it’s a little hard to take from Republicans who
want to be the president of the United States” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Holmes intimates two different kinds of doubt in his reference to “your
power or your premises.”27  The first kind of doubt is theoretically open to
resolution: we may not know whether we have enough power to conquer the
opposition, but we could find out by attempting to exert that power.  The
second kind of doubt is more difficult to settle: we cannot empirically prove
the rightness of our moral beliefs.28
There is a tendency in some circles to recoil at the latter kind of doubt
on the mistaken assumption that it leads inexorably to relativism or nihilism.
But not all forms of doubt are the same.  For example, Professor Steven D.
Smith has distinguished between “strong skepticism” and “weak skepticism”
that underpin “an expression of doubt” in modern First Amendment juris-
prudence.29  Strong skepticism, which Smith attributed to scholars like Judge
Robert Bork and Professor Martin Redish, questions all forms of knowledge
and, in Smith’s view, leads to relativism.30  Weak skepticism is different and
nonrelativistic.  It acknowledges that “every decision and action, whether pri-
vate or public, involves the possibility of error” but “does not drive us to
despair of the possibility of knowledge.”31  Instead, “while conceding that
absolute certainty may be unattainable,” weak skepticism insists on “the possi-
bility of knowing some things to a practical certainty.”32
Smith’s description of weak skepticism approximates an epistemic
humility that warrants subjective confidence in nonrelativistic truth claims.33
As he notes, it is possible to acknowledge doubt alongside confidence in the
27 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
28 These two kinds of doubt roughly correlate to the definition of “doubt” at the time
Holmes wrote his Abrams opinion. See 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 616 (1933)
(defining doubt as: “1. The (subjective) state of uncertainty with regard to the truth or
reality of anything; undecidedness of belief or opinion . . . . b. The condition of being
(objectively) uncertain; a state of affairs such as to give occasion for hesitation or
uncertainty”).
29 Smith, supra note 5, at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 See id. at 664.
31 Id. at 684–85 (emphasis omitted).
32 Id. at 684.  Smith argued that both strong and weak skepticism fell short as justifica-
tions for First Amendment speech protections, and he offered an alternative rationale
grounded in tolerance. Id. at 653 (“[M]odern first amendment theory has committed a
strategic error by embracing skepticism as a principal rationale for freedom of expression,
and . . . such freedom would rest more securely upon a foundation of tolerance which does
not depend upon relativism, fallibilism, or skepticism.”).  Tolerance, for Smith, means “an
attitude or policy whereby a person or government permits the expression of particular
views, while at the same time believing, perhaps with complete confidence, that such views
are false.” Id. at 700.  It rests not “on the fact of fallibility or on the possibility that the
other person’s opinion might be correct, but rather on the fact that the human good of
true belief can be realized only if belief is voluntary.” Id. at 707 (footnote omitted).
33 To be clear, Smith’s article critiqued weak skepticism as a theory of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, whereas my focus is on the more general question of whether weak
skepticism and tolerance can be held together in ordinary discourse.
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rightness of one’s beliefs.34  That is, in fact, how most of us live our lives.  As
the theologian Lesslie Newbigin observes, “[w]e are continually required to
act on beliefs that are not demonstrably certain and to commit our lives to
propositions that can be doubted.”35
Holmes’s reflections on doubt and certainty in Abrams fit within this
understanding of epistemic humility.36  And while his own views were closer
to relativism, he at least hints at the possibility of epistemic humility in some
of his other writing.  The year before his Abrams dissent, Holmes published
an essay on natural law in the Harvard Law Review.37  There, Holmes offered
an oft-quoted but puzzling aphorism: “Certitude is not the test of cer-
tainty.”38  Although the words “certitude” and “certainty” are often used
interchangeably in casual conversation, Holmes likely meant to signal some
sort of contrast.  Perhaps a clue to his intended meaning lies in the subtle
difference in emphasis of the words.  In Holmes’s day, like ours, the primary
meaning of “certainty” was the fact of what is true in an objective sense.  In
contrast, “certitude” meant a subjective state of being or an assured convic-
tion of mind.39  Following this distinction, we might translate Holmes’s state-
34 This is what Smith calls “practical certainty.”  Smith, supra note 5, at 684 (emphasis
omitted); cf. Michael Polanyi, The Stability of Beliefs, 3 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 217, 219, 230 (1952)
(describing his doubt-tempered belief in science as one which could “never be exhaustively
justified by statements of fact,” yet remained confident).
35 LESSLIE NEWBIGIN, PROPER CONFIDENCE: FAITH, DOUBT, AND CERTAINTY IN CHRISTIAN
DISCIPLESHIP 102 (1995).  New Testament scholar C. Kavin Rowe makes a similar observa-
tion: “The human condition is such that you have to choose how to live from among
options that rule one another out.”  C. KAVIN ROWE, ONE TRUE LIFE: THE STOICS AND EARLY
CHRISTIANS AS RIVAL TRADITIONS 1 (2016).  And we make that choice trusting in things
unseen: “[W]e wager our lives, one way or the other,” because “[w]e cannot know ahead of
the lives we live that the truth to which we devote ourselves is the truth worth devoting
ourselves to.” Id. at 258.  Rowe elaborates:
[N]o matter how many criteria we find for living in one way or another, we can-
not make them add up to a judgment about a true life before we live it.  “Come
join!” is not the same as “Test and confirm!” . . . There is really no place on which
to stand that could secure us against the need to live one way or another in faith.
And so we leap—or don’t.
Id. at 257–58.
36 See generally Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14
(explaining that Holmes “displayed an instinctive aversion to assertions of ‘absolute’
truth”); Grey, supra note 4, at 799, 803–04 (describing the pragmatist views generally attrib-
uted to Holmes); Smith, supra note 5, at 661 (reporting that Holmes “is said to have
doubted whether one can be sure that the sum of two plus two is four”).
37 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918).
38 Id. at 40.  Holmes continued: “We have been cock-sure of many things that were not
so.” Id.
39 The online Oxford English Dictionary defines “certainty” as “[t]hat which is certain;
the certain state of matters, the fact, the truth; a certain account.” Certainty, OXFORD ENG.
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/29979?redirectedFrom-certainty& (last vis-
ited Jan. 24, 2019).  It defines “certitude” as “[s]ubjective certainty; the state of being cer-
tain or sure of anything; assured conviction of the mind that the facts are so and so;
absence of doubt or hesitation; assurance, confidence.” Certitude, OXFORD ENG. DICTION-
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ment to mean: “One’s subjective belief in a truth claim is not the same as the
objective truth of that claim.”  In other words, just because we think we are
right—however intensely we believe in our rightness—we may, in fact, be
wrong.40  On the other hand, our subjective belief might also be objectively
true.
Elsewhere in his natural law essay, Holmes elaborates on the nature of
subjective belief by observing that we often arrive at our most deeply held
beliefs through experience:
What we most love and revere generally is determined by early associations.
I love granite rocks and barberry bushes, no doubt because with them were
my earliest joys that reach back through the past eternity of my life.  But
while one’s experience thus makes certain preferences dogmatic for oneself,
recognition of how they came to be so leaves one able to see that others,
poor souls, may be equally dogmatic about something else.  And this again
means scepticism.41
Here it is important to observe that Holmes is making an epistemic
claim, not an ontological one.  Whatever broader claims about transcen-
dence or reality Holmes embraced or rejected elsewhere, they do not fully
position his claim here.  In context, the skepticism to which he refers (which
makes us “able to see”) comes closer to admitting a kind of epistemic
humility than denying our ability to know truth with confidence or practical
ARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/30000?redirectedFrom=certitude#eid (last visited
Jan. 24, 2019).  The 1933 print edition had verbatim definitions. See 2 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 235 (1933) (including the definition of “certainty” as “[t]hat which is
certain; the certain state of matters, the fact, the truth; a certain account”); id. at 237
(including the definition of “certitude” as “[s]ubjective certainty; the state of being certain
or sure of anything; assured conviction of the mind that the facts are so and so; absence of
doubt or hesitation; assurance, confidence”).
40 Professor Vincent Blasi suggests a similar interpretation when he argues that
Holmes is cautioning us to “hold out at least the possibility that prior understandings will
be displaced.”  Blasi, supra note 36, at 19.  Or, more succinctly: “we might be wrong.” Id.
Other jurists have relied on Holmes’s claim in similar fashion.  In 1976, then-Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist invoked Holmes’s phrase in an argument against the emerging view of a
“living” Constitution.  He stated that the moral judgments of individual judges are ulti-
mately uncertain, and because “[c]ertitude is not the test of certainty,” those individual
judgments cannot exceed “the Constitution and the laws in our society.”  William H. Rehn-
quist, Observation, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 704 (1976)
(quoting Holmes, supra note 37, at 40).  Judge Richard Posner has echoed a similar cau-
tion: a judge’s “unshakable convictions” about the right result may in fact be wrong.  Rich-
ard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 13 (1996).  Elsewhere, Posner,
quoting Holmes, cautions judges to recognize that “[o]ne can feel something very strongly
without believing that one’s feeling is an adequate basis for constraining other people’s
behavior.”  Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1049, 1067–68 (2006).
41 Holmes, supra note 37, at 41.
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certainty.42  It sets up an argument more social than solipsistic: people hold
different views based on how they have been shaped.43
We see this socially oriented perspective play out in the passage that fol-
lows next in his essay:
Not that one’s belief or love does not remain.  Not that we would not fight
and die for it if important—we all, whether we know it or not, are fighting to
make the kind of a world that we should like—but that we have learned to
recognize that others will fight and die to make a different world, with equal
sincerity or belief.44
In other words, our differences really do matter, and our beliefs and
loves feel right to us.  But recognizing that we are all in some sense “fighting
to make the kind of a world that we should like” need not deepen our divi-
sions; to the contrary, it might be the first step toward greater empathy aris-
ing from a shared humanity.
For Holmes, the possibility of empathy begins by recognizing that our
deeply held moral beliefs share some affinities with far more mundane
preferences:
Deep-seated preferences can not be argued about—you can not argue a man
into liking a glass of beer—and therefore, when differences are sufficiently
far reaching, we try to kill the other man rather than let him have his way.
But that is perfectly consistent with admitting that, so far as appears, his
grounds are just as good as ours.45
A skeptical interpretation of this passage might see Holmes embracing a
full-throated moral relativism: deeply held ethical claims are mere “prefer-
ences” and people with contrary views ground those views in premises “just as
good as ours.”46  And, in fact, there is a way to move from such an interpreta-
tion to a pessimistic and brittle political theory, what Professor Robert
Gordon has characterized as the “bleakly skeptical foundations of [Holmes’s]
general outlook, according to which law and rights were only the systems
imposed by force by whatever social groups emerged as dominant in the
struggle for existence.”47  On balance, Holmes’s overall thought may indeed
lead to these dark conclusions.  But there is at least a hint of empathy—and
42 At Holmes’s writing, the word connoted both “the opinion that real knowledge of
any kind is unattainable” and “doubt or incredulity as to the truth of some assertion or
supposed fact.” Scepticism, VIII A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES, pt.
II, at 202 (Sir James A.H. Murray ed., 1914).
43 Paul Griffiths advances this kind of argument against more recent natural law for-
mulations.  Paul J. Griffiths, The Nature of Desire, FIRST THINGS (Dec. 2009), https://www
.firstthings.com/article/2009/12/the-nature-of-desire.
44 Holmes, supra note 37, at 41.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Introduction to THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 1 (Robert W. Gordon
ed., 1992); see also ALSCHULER, supra note 4.
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epistemic humility—in his Abrams dissent that points in a different
direction.48
II. EPISTEMIC HUMILITY WITHOUT SKEPTICISM
Holmes famously quipped that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic;
it has been experience.”49  He elaborated:
The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centu-
ries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corol-
laries of a book of mathematics.  In order to know what it is, we must know
what it has been, and what it tends to become.50
These perspectives do not suggest an open-ended pragmatism; in fact,
they might be better analogized to a tradition-based understanding of mean-
ing.51  Of course, to claim Holmes as a traditionalist would surpass even his
most hagiographic biographers.52  But the contrast between pragmatism and
traditionalism is nevertheless useful for situating the idea of epistemic
humility in Abrams.53
Professor Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that all human knowledge
should be understood through the lens of tradition, by which he means “an
historically extended, socially embodied argument.”54  MacIntyre elaborates
that “the history of a practice in our time is generally and characteristically
48 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
see also Blasi, supra note 36, at 23 (“Holmes was indeed a skeptic by temperament and self-
training.  But he was not a cynic or nihilist or disengaged agnostic.  The operational skepti-
cism that is integral to the scientific method bears little resemblance to the skepticism of
cynical withdrawal.  That difference is of the essence in trying to understand Holmes’s
thought in general and his views about free speech in particular.  He did not treat ideas,
his own or those of others, as trivial playthings.  To the contrary, he believed that forming
and defending strong opinions—not just self-serving preferences—is the stuff of life.”
(footnote omitted)).
49 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1881).
50 Id.
51 See Grey, supra note 4, at 807 (“Law is ‘a reaction between tradition on the one side
and the changing desires and needs of a community on the other.’  To identify law with
experience is to treat it as ‘policy coupled with tradition.’” (footnote omitted)).
52 See ALSCHULER, supra note 4, at 181–86 (tracing “The Beatification of Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes”).
53 My hunch is that Holmes’s explicit attention to history within his pragmatism is why
a traditionalist like Professor H. Jefferson Powell, infra notes 59–62 and accompanying
text, can find some resonances with him.
54 MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 222.  Neopragmatist understandings of knowledge
come closer to MacIntyre’s account than do earlier formulations of pragmatism. See Grey,
supra note 4, at 798 (“Whereas older accounts of pragmatism emphasized its instrumental-
ism, the distinctive feature of recent reinterpretations of pragmatism is to give equal signifi-
cance to its contextualist thesis—the idea that thought is essentially embedded in a context
of social practice.”).  A key difference between MacIntyre’s traditionalism and neopragmat-
ism is that the former accommodates and perhaps depends upon a teleology while the
latter does not require a telos that constrains action.
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embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer history
of the tradition through which the practice in its present form was conveyed
to us.”55  Traditions are the “context” into which we are all born.56
The problem that any pluralistic society confronts is that people living
within the polity inhabit different traditions.  A Muslim and an atheist may
shop at the same Whole Foods, but they disagree about fundamental matters.
When it comes to the issues that divide us, we have no “shared moral first
principles.”57  And we come to understand the meaning of words and ideas
from within our respective traditions.58
When these understandings produce conflicting moral assertions, we are
left with the high-stakes challenge of arbitrating meaning across different tra-
ditions.  And if we fail to meet that challenge, we will find ourselves in what
Professor H. Jefferson Powell has called “a wasteland of incommensurable
moral assertions.”59  Powell suggests that American constitutionalism offers a
way to avoid the wasteland.  Constitutional law will not overcome all of our
translation challenges because its “central function is to provide a means of
resolving political conflict that accepts the inevitability and persistence of
such conflict rather than the possibility of consensus or even broad agree-
ment on many issues.”60  But that imperfect solution is preferable to the
alternative of censoring opposition.
Powell characterizes Holmes’s Abrams dissent as “perhaps the most
famous statement” of American constitutionalism’s wager “that American
society is not MacIntyre’s wasteland.”61  In other words, different moral tradi-
tions can coexist within the same polity if we create and sustain the possibility
of listening to one another across our disagreements.  This kind of listening
requires a shared commitment to an ongoing effort toward mutual under-
standing by “men and women of civility acting in good faith.”62  That com-
mitment does not presume that all beliefs are equally valid or morally
harmless, nor does it assume that truth is beyond our reach.  But our mode
of engagement with one another matters—our proceduralism must reflect
the substantive values of trust and good faith.  And it is here that we return to
the importance of epistemic humility.  Opening the space for tolerant listen-
ing to opposing viewpoints gives us the opportunity to live with our differ-
ences as we seek to resolve them.  We will inevitably confront conflicting
55 MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 222.
56 Id. at 221–22.
57 Id. at 253.
58 To take one example, the English novelist George Orwell observed that words like
“equality” take on “several different meanings which cannot be reconciled with one
another.”  George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, 13 HORIZON 252, 258 (1946).
59 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDI-
CIAL DECISION 114 (2008).
60 Id. at 7.
61 Id. at 114.
62 Id. at 116.
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truth claims, but the manner in which we negotiate those conflicts matters a
great deal.63
III. APPLICATIONS
Having set out the substance and significance of epistemic humility in
the previous Parts, I turn now to three kinds of truth claims to illustrate its
First Amendment applications: claims whose certainty is not provable, claims
whose practical certainty is not yet proven, and claims that are certain to be
false.
A. Religious Truth Claims
One of the most interesting and longstanding examples of the role of
epistemic humility in the First Amendment context comes from judicial
reluctance to evaluate religious truth claims under the Free Exercise Clause.
Many religious truth claims are not falsifiable.  This is characteristic of many
claims about the substance of religious teachings as well as claims regarding
the sincerity or centrality of a belief or practice, or the burden imposed by a
restriction on that belief or practice.  Courts generally take one of two dis-
tinct approaches to these kinds of claims: (1) deferring to the religious claim-
ant with a kind of epistemic humility, and (2) resolving the legal issue while
avoiding the truth or falsity of the underlying religious claim.
The difference between these two approaches is illustrated in the 1944
case United States v. Ballard.64  Two members of a religious group known as
the “I Am” movement were convicted of mail fraud after soliciting donations
by describing their power to heal infirmities.65  Even though the falsity of
their representations was an element of the fraud charge, the Court deter-
mined that the First Amendment prohibited the jury from determining the
truth or falsity of the religious claims.66  Justice William Douglas’s majority
opinion reflected a posture of epistemic humility, asserting that religious
experiences are “beyond the ken of mortals.”67  Douglas also flagged a slip-
pery slope concern: if we allow the law to question more “preposterous” relig-
ious claims “then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any
sect.”68
Justice Robert Jackson’s dissent took a different approach.  He called the
defendants’ “teachings nothing but humbug, untainted by any trace of
63 Jeffrey Stout has offered a neopragmatist account of epistemic humility that criti-
cizes MacIntyre’s tradition-based account. See JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION
(2004).  Stout at one point refers to his position as “[c]ontextualist epistemology.” Id. at
240.
64 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
65 Id. at 79–80.
66 See id. at 86.
67 Id. at 87.
68 Id.  Thus, Justice Douglas was unwilling to preference broadly accepted religious
perspectives over more obscure religious claims because proving the truth of such claims is
beyond us.
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truth.”69  But these kinds of religious claims are “precisely the thing the Con-
stitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of
religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and even pay
for, a good deal of rubbish.”70
More recently, we can see epistemic humility at play in Justice Samuel
Alito’s opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.71  The business owners in
Burwell had objected to providing employee health insurance plans covering
contraception that affected already-fertilized eggs, as required under threat
of financial penalty by the Affordable Care Act’s implementing regulations.72
The owners grounded their objections to providing these forms of contracep-
tion in their religious belief that life begins at conception and that paying for
such forms of contraception was “immoral.”73  Alito concluded that courts
“ha[d] no business addressing” whether the religious beliefs of the religious
claimants were “reasonable.”74  He refused to assess whether “the coverage
demanded by the HHS regulations is connected to the destruction of an
embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for [the owners] to
provide the coverage” because
[t]his belief implicates a difficult and important question of religion and
moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a
person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of
enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.75
Sometimes the Court ignores epistemic humility under the guise of neu-
trality.  In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, the Court allowed
the government to build a logging road on public lands even though the
construction “would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred
areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and life-
way of Northwest California Indian peoples.”76  The Court consented to the
destruction of the holy sites without requiring a compelling government justi-
fication because the Justices concluded the government action had “no ten-
dency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs.”77
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority opinion insisted that the Court was
not evaluating the truth or falsity of the religious claims of the Native Ameri-
can litigants.78  The Court’s reasoning formally avoided the question of
69 Id. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 95.
71 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
72 Id. at 698–704.
73 Id. at 701–04.
74 Id. at 724.
75 Id.
76 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77 Id. at 450.
78 Id. at 450–51; see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (concluding that a federal
requirement that welfare agencies use a social security number did not violate the appel-
lant’s Native American religious beliefs because it promoted a legitimate public interest
that would not ultimately harm appellant’s religious practices).
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whether the religious claims were true, but effectively concluded they were
false by permitting the government to destroy the underlying religious prac-
tice without having to justify its interest.
Epistemic humility in cases involving religious truth claims does not
mean that religious claimants should always prevail.  Some religious truth
claims pose a danger to our society, whether it is because they run too
strongly against societal norms (like polygamy in the nineteenth century, or
cannibalism today) or because they threaten the physical safety of adherents
or the broader public.79  Approaching these cases with a posture of epistemic
humility would still weigh the social harm against the rights of the religious
claimants.  But it would be less dismissive of the religious truth claims than
other approaches.  Epistemic humility does not mean that religious claimants
must always win; it does mean that we should not dismiss their claims without
considering—and perhaps even showing respect for—the weight of their
claims.
B. Surgical and Hormonal Treatments for Transgender Children
Religious truth claims provide an example of epistemic humility in the
context of nonfalsifiable assertions.  Epistemic humility is also warranted
when assertions that may eventually be falsifiable are not yet fully under-
stood.  We can point to many such examples within the tradition of scientific
inquiry.  Take the now falsifiable claim that the earth is flat.  At one point in
history, prior to scientific and mathematical advances, the assertion that the
earth is flat was not falsifiable.  Today, setting aside a few outliers and NBA
superstars, most people agree that the earth is indeed round.80  There is no
longer the need for epistemic humility when we engage with flat earthers.
We might still choose civility, patience, and persuasion in lieu of hostility,
outrage, and coercion, but we need not set out our beliefs about a round
earth as tentative or loosely held.  But not all scientific assertions are as
clearly or overwhelmingly settled as our knowledge about the earth’s curva-
ture.  We remain limited in our understanding of vast swaths of human
inquiry.  Oftentimes, highly emotional and politicized debates highlight
79 The Supreme Court’s Mormon cases in the late nineteenth century provide a useful
illustration. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 41 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (finding that it “was
never intended or supposed that the [First A]mendment could be invoked as a protection
against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals
of society”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161, 164–65 (1878) (refusing to con-
sider the defendant’s claim that polygamy was required to prevent “damnation in the life
to come” by stating “it is impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom was intended” to protect such an “odious” practice (internal quotation marks
omitted)).  Whether the Court was justified in reaching its normative conclusions in these
cases is a different question.
80 Sopan Deb, Kyrie Irving Doesn’t Know if the Earth Is Round or Flat. He Does Want to
Discuss It., N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/movies/
kyrie-irving-nba-celtics-earth.html.  Kyrie has since clarified that he does in fact think the
earth is round, but his initial statement generated some controversy in light of his fame.
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these limits.  In these instances, our partial understanding counsels for epi-
stemic humility.
Consider the example of debates over the risks and benefits of gender
reassignment surgery or hormonal therapy involving children.  At the time of
this Article, the use of these procedures on children is relatively new.  We
have not yet had the benefit of long-term scientific reflection, and we lack
clear answers about their social and individual effects.81  We might think
these issues would therefore be well suited to a posture of epistemic humility
that would encourage inquiry, exploration, and dialogue.  In practice, this
has not happened.
For example, in August 2018, Brown University pulled an academic arti-
cle about gender dysphoria over concerns that it “might invalidate the per-
spectives of members of the transgender community.”82  Rather than engage
in discussion about the results of the study and the ways in which it may
impact the transgender community, progressive university administrators
ultimately chose not to engage with the topic at all.83  And Brown is not the
first academic institution to squelch these kinds of studies.  In October 2016,
over 600 members of the Johns Hopkins Medicine community petitioned the
university to disavow a paper cowritten by a Hopkins scholar in residence,
81 In October 2018, the American Academy of Pediatrics issued a policy statement
asserting that “[t]he available data reveal that pubertal suppression in children who iden-
tify as [Transgender and Gender-Diverse] generally leads to improved psychological func-
tioning in adolescence and young adulthood” but noted “[p]ubertal suppression is not
without risks.”  Jason Rafferty, Ensuring Comprehensive Care and Support for Transgender and
Gender-Diverse Children and Adolescents, 142 PEDIATRICS 1, 5 (2018) (footnotes omitted).
82 Jessica Finn, Brown University Pulls an Article on Its Own ‘Gender Dysphoria’ Study About
Teens Rapidly Identifying as Transgender Amid Complaints that the Research is ‘Transphobic,’
DAILY MAIL (Aug. 30. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.dailymail
.co.uk/news/article-6115103/Brown-University-pulls-gender-dysphoria-study-teens-identify-
ing-transgender-amid-transphobic.html.
83 See also Jeffrey S. Flier, As a Former Dean of Harvard Medical School, I Question Brown’s
Failure to Defend Lisa Littman, QUILLETTE (Aug. 31, 2018), https://quillette.com/2018/08/
31/as-a-former-dean-of-harvard-medical-school-i-question-browns-failure-to-defend-lisa-litt-
man/.  Flier’s commentary centered around Brown University Assistant Professor Dr. Lisa
Littman’s academic paper on rapid-onset gender dysphoria among clusters of teenage
girls.  Her peer-reviewed descriptive research “suggested that this often occurs after heavy
exposure to social-media content extoling the benefits of gender transition.” Id.  After
widespread social media outrage, the journal and university deleted online promotional
references and indicated Littman’s work would be subjected to additional review.  Flier
expressed concern at the elimination of discourse:
For centuries, universities struggled to protect the ability of their faculties to
conduct research seen as offensive—whether by the church, the state, or other
powerful influences.  Their success in this regard represents one of the great
intellectual triumphs of modern times, one that sits at the foundation of liberal
societies.  This is why the stakes are high at Brown University.  Its leaders must not
allow any single politically charged issue—including gender dysphoria—from
becoming the thin edge of a wedge that gradually undermines our precious,
hard-won academic freedoms.
Id.
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Lawrence S. Mayer.84  Mayer, a biostatistics professor at Arizona State Univer-
sity, cowrote a 143-page report that evaluated existing longitudinal studies on
gender identity in minors and measured mental health outcomes in the
transgender population.85  Opponents argued that it “mischaracterizes the
current state of the science on sexuality and gender” but did not engage in
substantive discussion or debate.86  And in Canada in December 2015,
Toronto’s Child Youth and Family Gender Identity Clinic (“GIC”) fired Dr.
Kenneth Zucker after he published The Myth of Persistence, an analysis of
“desistance” among transgender children.87  Zucker, a world-renowned
scholar on transgender issues, helped write the World Professional Associa-
tion for Transgender Health’s standards of care guidelines.88  Zucker’s
research on desistance triggered outrage, and the GIC ultimately paid a set-
tlement for wrongful termination and defamation.89
The issue is even more heated in popular discourse.  Take Jesse Singal’s
July 2018 Atlantic cover story that explored the growing gender-identity crisis
among children and adolescents.90  Singal called for caution in the debate
surrounding surgical and hormonal treatments for children identifying as
transgender.  Noting that adolescence is a time of “fevered identity explora-
tion,” he argued that the lack of available data should trigger greater pru-
dence on the part of parents, physicians, and society.91
Singal’s story was met with widespread outrage from progressive com-
mentators.92  In Slate, Alex Barasch referred to Singal as “a man whose own
84 Amy Ellis Nutt, Long Shadow Cast by Psychiatrist on Transgender Issues Finally Recedes at





86 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 Jesse Singal, How the Fight over Transgender Kids Got a Leading Sex Researcher Fired, CUT
(Feb. 7, 2016), https://www.thecut.com/2016/02/fight-over-trans-kids-got-a-researcher-
fired.html; see also Kenneth J. Zucker, Response, The Myth of Persistence, 19 INT’L J. TRANS-
GENDERISM 231 (2018).
88 Singal, supra note 87.
89 The Canadian Press, CAMH Reaches Settlement with Former Head of Gender Identity
Clinic, CBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/camh-settle-
ment-former-head-gender-identity-clinic-1.4854015.
90 Jesse Singal, When Children Say They’re Trans, ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/when-a-child-says-shes-trans/561749/.
91 Id.
92 Not that progressive commentators have cornered the market on outrage and insult
around these issues. See, e.g., Streiff, No, Guys, Dating a Transsexual Doesn’t Mean You’re
Tolerant and Open-Minded, RedState (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.redstate.com/streiff/
2018/01/13/no-guys-dating-transsexual-doesnt-mean-youre-tolerant-open-minded/ (“Ever
since a bunch of perverts and nincompoops humored Bruce Jenner’s delusions and
declared him ‘woman of the year,’ there has been a concerted campaign to mainstream
and normalize transsexualism as something natural and beautiful.”).
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neuroses leave him so unqualified to tell [the story].”93  In ThinkProgress,
Zack Ford called the article “a loud dog whistle for anti-transgender par-
ents.”94  And in a commentary published in Jezebel with the title What’s Jesse
Singal’s Fucking Deal?, Harron Walker described “Singal’s bullshit” and
asserted that Singal “writes about trans kids as a smokescreen for his anti-
trans sentiment.”95  Some of these commentators also pushed back on Sin-
gal’s methods, but their ad hominem attacks far outpaced their substantive
critiques.  Writing in Advocate, Amanda Kerri took a more measured
approach.96  Unlike much of the other commentary, Kerri grounded her cri-
tiques in Singal’s understanding of the issue and questioned his subject mat-
ter expertise.97  And, she urged that “[w]e need as much good information
and insight as possible, because many of us are still wrestling with these issues
ourselves.”98
Kerri’s response to Singal’s article also flagged “a legitimate concern
about the politicization of science and social justice.”99  This is an important
observation: the close link between scientific inquiry and normative argu-
ments complicates efforts toward epistemic humility.  But unless and until we
find greater scientific consensus, this issue—and others like it—warrants
greater epistemic humility and better dialogue.
C. Falsely Claimed Facts
Sections III.A and III.B offered examples of nonfalsifiable and not-yet
falsifiable claims that counsel a posture of epistemic humility.  Even these
examples encounter limits: epistemic humility need not extend to incitement
of religious violence or fringe challenges to widely settled scientific views.
But there are also categories of speech which, while formally protected under
the First Amendment, do not warrant a presumption of epistemic humility.
One such example comes from brazen denials of facts, as distinct from nor-
matively framed descriptions.  We can illustrate the difference with the exam-
93 Alex Barasch, Sacred Bodies, SLATE (June 20, 2018), https://slate.com/human-inter-
est/2018/06/desistance-and-detransitioning-stories-value-cis-anxiety-over-trans-lives.html.
94 Zack Ford, Atlantic Cover Story is a Loud Dog Whistle for Anti-Transgender Parents, THINK-
PROGRESS (June 20, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/atlantic-jesse-singal-transgender-kids-
54123639b640/ (referring to Singal as a “concern troll” whose article featured “lopsided
perspectives and [a] dearth of citations”).
95 Harron Walker, What’s Jesse Singal’s Fucking Deal?, JEZEBEL (June 19, 2018), https://
jezebel.com/whats-jesse-singals-fucking-deal-1826930495 (“I’d say that he so frequently
writes about trans kids as a smokescreen for his anti-trans sentiment.”).
96 Amanda Kerri, Why the Trans Community Hates The Atlantic’s Cover Story, ADVOCATE
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ple of the 2014 death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.100  It is a fact
that Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown and therefore committed
a homicide.  Whether Wilson is legally or morally culpable for Brown’s homi-
cide is a more complicated question (and is in fact two distinct questions, one
legal and one moral).  Many people have offered normative characterizations
such as “Wilson murdered Brown” or “Wilson acted in self-defense.”101
These kinds of claims have been made with varying degrees of responsibility
and good faith.  When and whether to extend epistemic humility to them is a
complicated question that involves contested understandings of legal norms
combined with partially known facts and evidence.
But consider a different kind of claim: “Wilson shot Brown on a Satur-
day.”  The claim is less interesting because it is fully verifiable and, somewhat
for that reason, largely uncontested.  If someone were to claim that Wilson
shot Brown on a Monday, we would simply say that the person was wrong
without extending any degree of epistemic humility.  That Wilson shot Brown
on a Saturday is a fact of the world different than the normatively contested
assertion that Wilson murdered Brown.102  As Professor Paul Horwitz has
noted, “There is no equality in the world of facts: it would be absurd to talk of
the equal dignity of claims that the moon is made of rock and that it is made
of cheese.”103
That some facts can be verified by almost anyone does not prevent peo-
ple from asserting false facts.104  For example, Donald Trump claimed dur-
ing a 2016 campaign rally in Birmingham, Alabama, that he saw “thousands
and thousands” of people cheering in Jersey City, New Jersey, after the World
100 Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not Indicted,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-
wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html.
101 See, e.g., Nicholas Mirzoeff, The Murder of Michael Brown: Reading the Ferguson Grand
Jury Transcript, SOC. TEXT, Mar. 2016, at 49; Paul Cassell, Officer Wilson Had a Powerful Case
for Self-Defense Under Missouri Law, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 26, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/26/officer-wil-
son-had-a-powerful-case-for-self-defense-under-missouri-law/?utm_term=.885b85446ab9.
102 A more controversial example is the claim that Brown had his hands in the air when
Wilson shot him.  A Department of Justice investigation found no physical or forensic evi-
dence supporting that claim.  Whether Brown raised his hands is a fact of the world unlike
the normative question of whether Brown was murdered.  Its empirical validity is harder to
ascertain than the day of the week Wilson shot Brown, but the weight of the evidence
strongly suggests that Brown did not have his hands in the air.  Wesley Lowery, Justice Dept.




103 Paul Horwitz, Essay, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV.
445, 471 (2012).
104 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897,
897–98 (2010) (providing examples of political claims proven false, which individuals
nonetheless persist in believing).
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Trade Center fell on September 11, 2001.105  Even after being confronted
with the complete lack of evidence for his claim, he maintained that New
Jersey’s “Arab population” was “cheering as the buildings came down.”106
On the other side of the ideological spectrum, Hillary Clinton insisted that
then–Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh referred to birth control
pills as “abortion-inducing drugs” during his televised testimony when in fact
he did not make such a statement.107  And in another judicial nomination
hearing, Democratic senators asserted that now–Seventh Circuit Judge Amy
Coney Barrett had written an article stating that her Catholic faith would
affect her constitutional views when, in fact, her article made exactly the
opposite claim.108
Even scientifically verifiable facts are not safe from challenge.  In 2013,
anti–genetically modified organism (“anti-GMO”) advocates testified in sup-
port of a bill in Hawaii banning genetically engineered crops on the state’s
largest island in response to the proliferation of papaya plants engineered to
be resistant to a virus that had destroyed papaya crops in the state.  These
advocates relied on studies shown to be unreliable by mainstream scientists,
and they falsely claimed that “there were no independent studies of the safety
of genetically modified organisms,” when, in reality, there were more than
100 independent studies.109  These same advocates claimed that 270,000
farmers in India had been driven to suicide due to the practices of the agri-
culture companies selling genetically modified seeds, when, in fact, suicide
105 Lauren Carroll, Fact-Checking Trump’s Claim That Thousands in New Jersey Cheered When
World Trade Center Tumbled, POLITIFACT (Nov. 22, 2015) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/nov/22/donald-trump/
fact-checking-trumps-claim-thousands-new-jersey-ch/.
106 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Hillary Clinton (@HillaryClinton), TWITTER (Sept. 12, 2018, 6:14 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/HillaryClinton/status/1039864914486149121; see also Manuela Tobias, Did Brett
Kavanaugh Call Birth Control Abortion-Inducing Drugs? No, POLITIFACT (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2018/sep/10/kamala-harris/brett-
kavanaugh-birth-control-abortion-inducing/.  In a subsequent hearing, then-Judge Kava-
naugh’s testimony about his high school drinking habits and the meaning of words in his
high school yearbook raised their own set of questions about truthfulness. See Briahna
Gray & Camille Baker, The Unbearable Dishonesty of Brett Kavanaugh, INTERCEPT (Sept. 29,
2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/09/29/the-unbearable-dishonesty-of-brett-kava-
naugh/ (“Kavanaugh claimed references to ‘Renate Alumnius’ in his yearbook were allu-
sions to his friendship with classmate Renate Schroeder Dolphin, and not, as many
understood, a sexist smear about her promiscuity.”).
108 C.C. Pecknold, Opinion, Democrats Find Another Religious Heretic, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-find-another-religious-heretic-
1505323653.
109 Amy Harmon, A Lonely Quest for Facts on Genetically Modified Crops, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/us/on-hawaii-a-lonely-quest-for-facts-about-
gmos.html.
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rates among Indian farmers did not rise after the introduction of commercial
GMOs.110
Climate change deniers are also well known for broadly denying scientif-
ically accepted facts.  For example, former Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator Scott Pruitt has said he does not believe carbon dioxide cre-
ated by human activity is a “primary contributor” to global warming.111
Pruitt’s statement contradicts ninety-seven percent of climate scientists, who
agree that “[c]limate-warming trends over the past century are extremely
likely due to human activities.”112
Some falsities and lies can be criminalized, as is the case with laws gov-
erning fraud and perjury.113  But the Supreme Court has made clear that at
least some lies are protected under the First Amendment.114  In United States
v. Alvarez, a plurality of the Court invalidated the Stolen Valor Act, which had
criminalized false statements about military decorations.  Justice Anthony
Kennedy concluded that lies could be instrumentally valuable because “the
outrage and contempt expressed for respondent’s lies can serve to reawaken
and reinforce the public’s respect for the Medal, its recipients, and its high
purpose.”115  Citing Holmes’s Abrams dissent, Kennedy observed that “[t]he
theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’”116
Whatever instrumental value the Court may see in some lies, its decision
to protect them is not rooted in epistemic humility.  There is no sense in
which Kennedy protects the lie in Alvarez because it might actually be true.
To the contrary, he suggests that “[t]he response to the unreasoned is the
rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the sim-
ple truth.”117  Moreover, even in the absence of legal enforceability, we
110 Id.; see Natasha Gilbert, A Hard Look at GM Crops, NATURE, May 2013, at 24, 25,
https://www.nature.com/news/case-studies-a-hard-look-at-gm-crops-1.12907.
111 Tom DiChristopher, EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Says Carbon Dioxide Is Not a Primary Contrib-
utor to Global Warming, CNBC (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/09/epa-
chief-scott-pruitt.html.
112 Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/sci-
entific-consensus/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2016).
113 See Horwitz, supra note 103, at 453 (“Many laws, especially those concerning defa-
mation and commercial speech, contain permissible ‘restrictions on false, deceptive, and
misleading communications.’  The Court has treated other laws involving potential falsity,
such as perjury, fraud, and speech-related crime, as falling outside the boundaries of the
First Amendment altogether.” (footnotes omitted)).
114 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion).
115 Id. at 727.  The plurality’s holding was in some tension with the Court’s earlier juris-
prudence. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“[T]here is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact.  Neither the intentional lie nor the care-
less error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’
debate on public issues.” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
116 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 728 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
117 Id. at 727.  As Professor Joseph Blocher observes, the fact that the law sometimes
distinguishes truth from falsity suggests that the reason for protecting the latter cannot
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might embrace a cultural norm that rejects epistemic humility in such
circumstances.118
D. The Importance of Social Practice
The preceding examples illustrate the role of epistemic humility in three
different kinds of truth claims: those whose certainty is not provable, those
whose practical certainty is not yet proven, and those that are certain to be
false.  These kinds of distinctions might be helpful as a rough sorting, but do
they really hold up under scrutiny?  Consider two religious claims: (1) Jesus
Christ rose from the dead, and (2) the earth is only several thousand years
old.  Millions of people in this country believe both of these claims to be true.
But we might ask whether the same degree of epistemic humility is warranted
in both cases simply because they are religious claims.  Are they both entitled
to epistemic humility because they are religious?  Is one more falsifiable than
the other?  Do we have a social practice around scientific arguments that
more strongly rules out one of these claims—and if so, which one?
Or what about the line between claims whose practical certainty is not
yet proven and those that are certain to be false?  At some point not too long
ago, the scientific community would not have been able to say with practical
certainty that climate change is real or that GMOs are safe.  So when, pre-
cisely, is epistemic humility off the table with respect to these kinds of claims?
It may be that our showing of epistemic humility depends in part on the
social context that justifies our beliefs about beliefs.119  Today, we generally
acknowledge claims about transcendence to be nonfalsifiable, we generally
regard the effects of some medical procedures as not fully specified, and we
generally view empirical claims that contradict the overwhelming weight of
scientific evidence to be false.  As Professor Jeffrey Stout has argued, the con-
text that justifies these beliefs could change: “It is perfectly conceivable that
we will someday be justified in deviating significantly from the beliefs we are
currently justified in believing.”120  But in the meantime, the fact of our
“underlying social agreement”121 about these general categories gives us
some ability to make judgments as to when certain claims warrant epistemic
humility.
depend entirely on our inability to distinguish it from the former. See generally Joseph
Blocher, Knowledge and the First Amendment (Oct. 23, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
118 Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Truth-Seeking Value, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 55, 63
(2015) (arguing that the Alvarez plurality “intimated that assessing the truth or falsity of
such claims belongs to citizens, not to single-issue tribunals set up by the government”).
119 Blocher advances a similar argument in recent work. See Blocher, supra note 117.
120 STOUT, supra note 63, at 233.  Because our justifications are warranted in our con-
text, “it would be foolish to address our justifications to the audience of all rational agents,
regardless of time or place.” Id. at 236.  Stout argues this is humility, not skepticism. Id. at
233.
121 Id. at 277.
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CONCLUSION
I have titled this Article Holmes, Humility, and How Not to Kill Each Other.
The last section of the title highlights what is at stake.  Those of us with the
gift of reflective time can and should debate historical figures like Holmes,
opinions like Abrams, and theoretical concepts like epistemic humility.  But
every one of us has a civic responsibility to minimize the risk of political vio-
lence.  The more we see others, and the beliefs they hold, as beyond the pale
of epistemic humility, the greater the risk that our underlying social agree-
ment will collapse.  That does not mean we should stop arguing about what
ought to warrant epistemic humility.  The First Amendment allows us to say
almost anything to anyone, but our shared civic project depends upon some
meaningful constraints on our discourse.  The significance of this task comes
into even greater relief when we realize that Abrams—like the other cases that
produced the great First Amendment opinions from Holmes and his col-
league, Justice Louis Brandeis—did not involve individuals, but groups.122
Groups increase our power, for good and for bad.123  And most of us organ-
ize into groups.
Holmes was far more familiar with actual killing than most of us.  When
he warned that people who believe with too much certainty will kill each
other, it was because he had seen it in the Civil War.  Sometimes, perhaps,
the willingness to kill and die for something you believe is warranted.  But for
most societies, especially pluralistic democratic societies, survival depends on
keeping those moments exceedingly rare.  And we ought not take our rela-
tive peace for granted.
122 The defendant in Abrams v. United States was charged with four counts of conspiracy.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 616 (1919).  Similarly, the defendant in Whitney v.
California was charged with violating the Criminal Syndicalism Act.  Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 359 (1927).
123 See, e.g., AMY CHUA, POLITICAL TRIBES: GROUP INSTINCT AND THE FATE OF NATIONS
(2018); INAZU, supra note 6; NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PER-
SONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA (1998).
